RTCA DO-254 / EUROCAE ED-80, Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware is a document providing guidance for the development of airborne electronic hardware, published by RTCA, Incorporated and EUROCAE. The DO-254/ED-80 standard was formally recognized by the FAA in 2005 via AC 20-152 as a means of compliance for the design assurance of electronic hardware in airborne systems.
The guidance in this document is applicable, but not limited, to such electronic hardware items as
The document classifies electronic hardware items into simple or complex categories. An item is simple "if a comprehensive combination of deterministic tests and analyses appropriate to the design assurance level can ensure correct functional performance under all foreseeable operating conditions with no anomalous behavior."
Conversely, a complex item is one that cannot have correct functional performance ensured by tests and analyses alone; so, assurance must be accomplished by additional means.
The body of DO-254/ED-80 establishes objectives and activities for the systematic design assurance of complex electronic hardware, generally presumed to be complex custom micro-coded components, as listed above. However, simple electronic hardware is within the scope of DO-254/ED-80 and applicants propose and use the guidance in this standard to obtain certification approval of simple custom micro-coded components, especially devices that support higher level (A/B) aircraft functions.
The DO-254/ED-80 standard is the counterpart to the well-established software standard RTCA DO-178C/EUROCAE ED-12C. With DO-254/ED-80, the certification authorities have indicated that avionics equipment contains both hardware and software, and each is critical to safe operation of aircraft. There are five levels of compliance, A through E, which depend on the effect a failure of the hardware will have on the operation of the aircraft. Level A is the most stringent, defined as "catastrophic" effect (e.g., loss of the aircraft), while a failure of Level E hardware will not affect the safety of the aircraft. Meeting Level A compliance for complex electronic hardware requires a much higher level of verification and validation than Level E compliance.
- Plan for Hardware Aspects of Certification (PHAC)
- Hardware Development/Design Plan (HDP)
- Hardware Computer Installation & Assembly
- Hardware Validation and Verification Plan (HVVP)
- Hardware Process Assurance Plan (HPAP)
- Hardware Configuration Management Plan (HCMP)
- Hardware Configuration Index (HCI)
- Hardware Requirements Standards (HRS)
- Hardware Requirements Document (HRD)
- Hardware Design Standards/Specification (HDS)
- Hardware Validation and Verification Standards (HVVS)
- Hardware Requirements Document (HRD)
- Hardware Interface Control Data (HICD)
- Hardware Implementation (HI)
- Hardware Test Cases & Procedures (HTCP)
- Hardware Test Results (HTR)
- Hardware Verification Analysis (HVA)
- Hardware Traceability Matrix (HTM)
- Hardware Accomplishment Summary (HAS)
Requirements Management
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The RTCA DO-154 and EUROCAE ED-80 Design Assurance Guidance for Airborne Electronic Hardware divide flight electronics hardware and components into two camps: simple and complex. Simple electronic hardware be tested to ensure that it works correctly under all operating conditions with no anomalies.
Complex hardware pertains to items considered to be so complex that it is impractical to ensure its correct functioning through standard tests and design processes.
DO-254 and EUROCAE ED-80 define five design assurance levels, commonly referred to as DAL, that describe how critical these components are for safe flight. The different DAL levels progressively describe components whose importance ranges from extremely important to trivial for safe flight.
DAL A describes flight electronics hardware whose failure or malfunction could cause a catastrophic, hazardous, or severe condition that would result in the deaths of everyone aboard the aircraft.
DAL B describes flight electronics hardware whose failure or malfunction could cause a severe or hazardous condition that could involve some loss of life. DAL C, meanwhile, describes hardware whose failure or malfunction would result in a major flight condition that likely will involve serious injuries.
DAL D describes hardware whose failure or malfunction would result in a condition that causes only a minor non-life-threatening flight condition. DAL E, finally, describes hardware whose failure or malfunction would have no effect on the aircraft's operational capability or pilot workload.
More information on the five Design Assurance Levels of DO-254 and EUROCAE ED-80 is available online from the FAA at www.faa.gov. Also contact the RTCA at www.rtca.org, or EUROCAE at www.eurocae.net.
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